BEFORE THE UNITED STATES JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION

IN RE: CCELL CLOSED CANNABIS OIL VAPORIZATION SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS PRODUCTS	**MDL NO. _____**

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF B.Z.'S MOTION FOR TRANSFER AND CONSOLIDATION OF ACTIONS PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1407 TO THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407 and Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation ("JPML") Rule 6.2, Plaintiff B.Z., on behalf of himself and others similarly situated, respectfully submits this Memorandum in support of his Motion for an order from the Panel transferring and consolidating the currently-filed cases listed in the attached Schedule of Actions (collectively, "the Actions") as well as any cases subsequently filed involving similar facts or claims ("tag-along cases"):

I. INTRODUCTION

The Actions pending in the Northern District of Illinois, the Southern District of Florida, the District of Nevada, and the Northern District of California contain nearly identical allegations. These Actions are in front of no fewer than four federal judges in four different districts currently presiding over proposed overlapping class cases against Shenzhen Smoore Technology Co. Ltd., owned by Smoore International Holdings Limited (collectively "Smoore"), or its authorized distributors—Jupiter Research LLC ("Jupiter"); Greenlane Holdings, Inc. ("Greenlane"); 3Win Corp. ("3Win"); CB Solutions, LLC d/b/a Canna Brand Solutions ("CB Solutions," and together with Jupiter, Greeenlane, and 3Win, the "Distributor Defendants" and along with Smoore collectively "Defendants") that all involve the very same products, the same underlying legal theory of liability, based on the same factual allegations.

Namely, Plaintiffs in each Action allege that Smoore monopolized the manufacture and

distribution of CCELL closed cannabis oil vaporization products, cartridges, component parts, or all-in-one devices systems and components (the "Products"). The Actions allege Defendants conspired amongst themselves, entering into agreements that created a minimum price floor for the Products, prevented the purchase of competing products, allocated markets by not competing for one another's customers, and shared price and customer information with one another. Accordingly, each of these Actions assert class claims under both federal and state antitrust and competition laws, including alleged violations of the antitrust and consumer protection laws in 27 states. Upon information and belief, through these anti-competitive actions, Smoore manufactures and distributes as much as 80% of the closed cannabis oil vaping devices in the United States and sells the Products directly to cannabis producers and wholesale distributors, including to the Distributor Defendants. None of these cases have entered into discovery, and all are in the nascent stages of litigation. Moreover, the proposed classes in each of the four proposed class actions overlap.

As such, all Section 1407 elements are met. Absent transfer and consolidation, there would be an enormous amount of unnecessary duplication and a needless diversion of judicial resources, and there is also a substantial risk of inconsistent and conflicting rulings on critical issues, including but not limited to federal preemption and class certification. For these reasons and for the reasons set forth more fully below, transfer and consolidation are fully warranted here.

B.Z. counsel conferred with Defendants regarding this instant motion and Defendants will oppose transfer. Plaintiffs in the Illinois, Florida and Nevada Actions consent to transfer and consolidation in the Northern District of Illinois.

II. BACKGROUND AND STATUS OF LITIGATION

A. The Pending Cases

At least four proposed class Actions have been filed against Defendants in no fewer than four federal district courts, bringing federal and state antitrust violation claims relating to Defendants' anticompetitive actions and omissions. As detailed in the Schedule of Actions, the pending class actions are as follows:

1. *B.Z. v. Shenzhen Smoore Technology Company, Ltd*., et al, Case No. 1:25-cv-07482 (N.D. Ill. Filed July 2, 2025) ("*B.Z.*") (*see B.Z.* Docket Report and Compl., Ex. 1 & 2.)

2. *S.K., D.G., D.C. v. Shenzhen Smoore Technology Company, Ltd., et al,* Case No.5:24-cv-09090 (N.D. Cal. Filed December, 16, 2024, First Amended Complaint filed March 7. 2025) ("*S.K.*") (*see S.K.* Docket Report and First Amended Compl., Ex. 3 & 4.)

3. *M.M. v. Shenzhen Smoore Technology Company, Ltd.,* et al, Case No. 2:25-cv-01163 (D. Nev. filed June 27, 2025) ("*M.M.*") (*see M.M.* Docket Report and Compl., Ex. 5 & 6.)

4. *Rukeyser v. Shenzhen Smoore Technology Company, Ltd., et al*, Case No. 2:25-cv-14238 (S.D. Fla. filed July 3, 2025) ("*Rukeyser*") (*see Rukeyser* Docket Report and Compl., Ex. 7 & 8.)

See Schedule of Actions.[1]

There is a fifth action pending that was recently related to the *S.K.* action, *Earth's Healing, Inc. v. Shenzhen Smoore Technology Co. Ltd. et al*, Case No. 3:25-cv-01428 (N.D. Cal.) ("*Earth's Healing*") (*see Earth's Healing* Docket Report, Ex. 9; *see also* First Amended Complaint filed May 30, 2025, Ex. 10). The *Earth's Healing* action is a direct purchaser plaintiff ("DPP") class action in the Northern District of California alleging violations of the United States' antitrust laws against Defendants related to their sales of closed cannabis oil vaporization products in the United States and its territories. *See Earth's Healing* Amended Complaint, Ex. 10.

[1] One other action was filed in the United States District Court of Arizona but voluntarily dismissed. *H.H. v. Shenzhen Smoore Technology Company Limited et al*, Case No. 2:25-cv-02259 (D. Ariz. filed June 28, 2025) ("*H.H.*") (*see H.H.* Civil Docket and Compl., Ex. 11)

The Actions are based upon the identical allegations. Smoore is a monopolist in the manufacture and distribution of the Products[2] by allegedly engaging in a number of forms of anticompetitive conduct, including (1) entering into anticompetitive distribution agreements with Distributor Defendants to create a minimum price floor; (2) agreeing to only sell Smoore's Products; (3) agreeing to allocate markets by not competing for customers, and putting agreements in place to share customer information with one another; (4) locking Distributor Defendants into exclusively selling only Smoore's products; (5) preventing Distributor Defendants from competing directly with Smoore in the manufacture of closed cannabis oil vaporization products, cartridges, component parts, or all-in-one devices systems and components and depriving distributors of alternate sources of supply; (6) requiring Distributor Defendants to post a security deposit that is used to penalize Distributor Defendants if they do not comply with the other anticompetitive provisions of their distribution agreement with Smoore; and (7) filing frivolous patent litigation against would-be competitors in the manufacture and sale of competing cannabis vape cartridge products for the United States. *See*, *e.g.*, *B.Z.* Compl., Ex. 2, ¶¶ 10-11 (alleging Defendants "entered an anticompetitive scheme to charge cannabis oil producers and other consumers of the Products supracompetitive prices for closed cannabis oil vaporization systems," "entered into agreements that created a minimum price floor for the Products" and "agreed that Distributor Defendants would only sell Smoore's Products and not those of Smoore's competitors, agreed to allocate markets by not competing for one another's customers, and agreed to share price and customer information with one another."); *M.M.* Compl., Ex. 6, ¶¶ 10-11 (same); *Rukeyser* Compl., Ex. 8, ¶¶ 10-11 (same); *S.K.* Compl., Ex. 4, ¶ 9 (alleging Smoore's distributor agreements "are

[2] The Products at issue in each of the pending cases are also the same; specifically: empty cannabis vape cartridges, mouth pieces, trays of deformable material with voids for holding cartridge bodies, trays of deformable material with voids for holding mouthpieces, and coverings.

unlawful under the antitrust laws because the agreements for CCELL products (i) contain illegal exclusivity agreements which forbid distributors from selling competing products; (ii) include mandatory price restraints that require distributors sell downstream at prices set by Smoore (iii) banned competition whereby Smoore's distributors are banned from selling Smoore's products to Smoore's competitors; and (iv) include the collection of security deposits on sales to penalize distributors who do not comply with Smoore's pricing restraints").

In all of the Actions, the Plaintiffs seek certification of overlapping nationwide classes and state classes of indirect purchaser, end-user consumers (the "Indirect Purchaser Plaintiffs" or "IPP"), of the Products. *See*, e.g., *S.K.* Compl., Ex. 4, ¶¶ 130-131 (seeking certification of a national class and multi-state class ("Arizona, California, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, Puerto Rico, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, West Virginia and Wisconsin and any other unnamed United States indirect purchaser jurisdictions") of indirect purchaser who purchased the Products); *B.Z.* Compl., Ex. 2, ¶¶ 126-127 (seeking certification of a nationwide class (Nationwide Relief Class) and multi-state class (State Law Damages Class) (same states) of all indirect purchaser, end-user consumers, who purchased the Products); *M.M.* Compl., Ex. 6, ¶¶ 126-127 (same); *Rukeyser* Compl., Ex. 8, ¶¶ 133-134 (same).

B. Status of the Pending Cases

All of the Actions are in the beginning stages of litigation, with currently operative Complaints filed within the last 4 months, and Defendants have yet to file an answer in any of the Actions. *See B.Z.* Docket Report, Ex. 1; *S.K.* Docket Report, Ex. 3; *M.M.* Docket Report, Ex. 5; *Rukeyser* Docket Report, Ex. 7. As a consequence, discovery has not begun.

On May 19, 2025, the court overseeing *S.K.* related that case with *Earth's Healing*. *See* Earths Docket Report, Ex. 9. On July 21, 2025, the *S.K* and *Earth's Healing* Plaintiffs stipulated that *S.K.* would serve as the IPPs' operative complaint and *Earth's Healing* would serve as the DPPs' operative complaint. Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss both complaints on June 27, 2025. *See* Earth's Docket Report, Ex. 9; S.K. Docket Report, Ex. 3. Plaintiffs' expected response was due July 18, 2025, but due to the filing of an Amended Complaint in *S.K.* on July 16, 2025, the deadline to respond to that pleading is August 18, 2025, and the Motion to Dismiss is moot. *See S.K.* Docket Report, Ex. 3.

III. DISCUSSION

A. The Actions Meet the 28 U.S.C. § 1407 Standard for Transfer and Consolidation

The Actions pending against Defendants in four different jurisdictions present precisely the sort of situation for which 28 U.S.C. § 1407 was enacted and thus plainly meet the standards for transfer and consolidation articulated by this Panel. *See*, *e.g.*, *In re Food Fair,* 465 F. Supp. 1301, 1304-05 (J.P.M.L. 1979); *In re Plumbing Fixture Cases*, 298 F. Supp. 484, 490-92 (J.P.M.L. 1968).

As the Panel has repeatedly emphasized, transfer and consolidation are appropriate when actions pending in different judicial districts involve similar questions of fact such that consolidating pretrial proceedings would "promote the just and efficient conduct of such actions." 28 U.S.C. § 1407. In relevant part, 28 U.S.C. § 1407 provides as follows:

> When civil actions involving one or more common questions of fact are pending in different districts, such actions may be transferred to any district for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings. Such transfers shall be made by the judicial panel on multidistrict litigation authorized by this section upon its determination that transfers for such proceedings will be for the convenience of parties and witnesses and will promote the just and efficient conduct of such actions.

Id.; *see also, e.g., In re Nifedipine*, 266 F. Supp. 2d 1382, 1382 (J.P.M.L. 2003).

Given the very similar and, in many instances, identical allegations in each of the Actions,

the threshold requirement that the Actions involve common issues of fact is easily met. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 1407. *Compare also generally B.Z.* Compl., Ex. 2, *M.M.* Compl., Ex. 6, *Rukeyser* Compl., Ex., 8, *S.K.* Compl., Ex. 4. Moreover, there are several other benefits to transfer and consolidation, including the fact that it would promote efficiency, minimize the potential for duplicative discovery, minimize the likelihood of inconsistent pretrial decisions (including inconsistent class decisions), and increase the possibility of achieving coordination between the federal courts and any state courts that later become involved.

1. There Are Numerous Overlapping Actions Containing Nearly Identical Claims And Factual Allegations

As explained above, Defendants are currently defending four proposed class actions in four different jurisdictions in which relief is sought for overlapping nationwide and state classes based upon nearly identical factual allegations. *See supra* at 3-4. This alone is sufficient to warrant transfer and consolidation. *See*, e.g., *In re HSBC Bank*, 949 F. Supp. 2d 1358 (J.P.M.L. 2013) (consolidating three class actions); *In re Foot Locker*, 787 F. Supp. 2d 1364, 1366 (J.P.M.L. 2011) (transferring and consolidating four class actions); *In re VA Data Theft*, 461 F. Supp. 2d 1367, 1369 (J.P.M.L. 2006) (transferring and consolidating three class actions); *see also In re Plumbing Fixture*s, 308 F. Supp. 242, 244 (J.P.M.L. 1970) ("Such a potential for conflicting or overlapping class actions presents one of the strongest reasons for transferring such related actions to a single district for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings which will include an early resolution of such potential conflicts.").

Common questions of law and fact exist in each of the Actions. Each Action alleges that Defendants' anticompetitive conspiracy implicate and are generally applicable to all classes. The common factual and legal questions before the courts in the Actions include, *inter alia*: whether Defendants engaged in a conspiracy in violation of the antitrust laws; whether Defendants conduct

violated federal or state antitrust statues; whether Defendants engaged in unfair methods of competition, and unfair and deceptive acts, in violation of state consumer protection laws; whether Defendants' conspiracy and agreements had anticompetitive effects in the relevant markets; whether Defendants' actions alleged herein caused injury to Plaintiffs and the class members by causing them to pay artificially inflated prices in the relevant markets during the class period; the appropriate measure of damages; and the propriety of declaratory and injunctive relief. *See*, *B.Z.* Compl., Ex. 2, ¶ 133; ; *S.K.* Compl., Ex. 4, ¶ 135; *M.M.* Compl., Ex. 6, ¶ 133; *Rukeyser* Compl., Ex., 8 ¶¶ 140. Given the commonality of factual issues in each of the related cases, MDL treatment is appropriate. *See* e.g., *In re Fosamax Prods*. *Liab. Litig*., 444 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1349 (J.P.M.L. 2006).

2. Transfer and Consolidation Would Promote Efficiency and Minimize the Potential for Duplicative Discovery

Transfer and consolidation of these Actions would promote efficiency and minimize the potential for duplicative discovery. *See*, e.g., *In re Skelaxin* (Metaxalone), 856 F. Supp. 2d 1350, 1352 (J.P.M.L. 2012). As discussed above, each of the Actions is based upon allegations that Defendants engaged in anticompetitive conducts, entered into anticompetitive distribution agreements, locked in distributors into exclusively selling Smoore's Products, etc. *See* Motion, *supra,* at pp. 3-4. The Panel has consistently held that transfer under Section 1407 is intended to prevent such duplication. *See*, e.g., *In re Starmed Health Pers. FLSA Litig*., 317 F. Supp. 2d 1380, 1381 (J.P.M.L. 2004) (consolidating two actions in part because transfer was necessary to "eliminate duplicative discovery" and "conserve the resources of the parties").

The application of federal and state antitrust law to Plaintiffs' claims will undoubtedly be a threshold question that can best be decided by one federal judge instead of four or more. *See In re Acetaminophen* – ASD/ADHD Prods. Liability Litig., 2022 WL 5409345, * 2 (J.P.M.L. 2022)

("A single MDL is the most appropriate vehicle for resolving defendants' common defenses concerning preemption and general causation"). Moreover, Plaintiffs in each of these Actions are likely to seek discovery regarding, among other things, communications between distributors, the distribution agreements, and Defendants' selling and distribution practices. *See In re 100% Grated Parmesan Cheese Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig.,* 201 F. Supp. 3d 1375, 1378 (J.P.M.L. 2016) (noting that transfer and consolidation were appropriate to handle overlapping discovery when the actions shared a common factual core); *In re Yamaha Motor Corp. Rhino*, 597 F.Supp.2d 1377, 1378 (J.P.M.L. 2009) (finding consolidation appropriate in order to minimize duplicative discovery regarding allegations of vehicle defects, even when numerous non-class cases also posed individualized factual questions).; *In re Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) Antitrust Litig.,* 228 F. Supp. 2d 1379, 1380–81 (J.P.M.L. 2002) ("Centralization under Section 1407 is thus necessary in order to eliminate duplicative discovery, prevent inconsistent pretrial rulings (especially with respect to class certification matters), and conserve the resources of the parties, their counsel and the judiciary.").

In addition, these complex antitrust Actions regarding Defendants' engagement in anticompetitive practices will require expert reports and likely *Daubert* hearings, all of which would be more efficiently handled in a consolidated proceeding. *See, e.g., In re Natrol, Inc. Glucosamine/Chondroitin*, 26 F. Supp. 3d 1392, 1393 (J.P.M.L. 2014). Furthermore, the Actions seek the same relief, meaning that discovery in the cases will necessarily overlap, involving the same documentary evidence. Similarly, plaintiffs in each of the cases are likely to seek to depose the same witnesses. *See, e.g., In re Auto Body Shop,* 37 F. Supp. 3d 1388, 1390 (J.P.M.L. 2014) (transfer before a single judge was beneficial, because the judge could "structure pretrial proceedings to accommodate all parties' legitimate discovery needs while ensuring that common

witnesses are not subjected to duplicative discovery demands"); *In re Enfamil Lipil*, 764 F. Supp. 2d 1356, 1357 (J.P.M.L. 2011) ("Centralizing the actions will allow for the efficient resolution of common issues and prevent unnecessary or duplicative pretrial burdens from being placed on the common parties and witnesses.").

Given the similarity of the Actions, the overlapping legal issues and the potential for duplicative discovery, transfer and consolidation would inevitably conserve the parties' resources. *See, e.g., In re Air Crash at Dallas/Fort Worth Airport,* 623 F. Supp. 634, 635 (J.P.M.L. 1985). It would also conserve the judicial resources, as it would assign responsibility for overseeing threshold legal determinations and a pretrial plan (if necessary) to one judge as opposed to four or more different federal judges. *See, e.g., In re Pineapple*, 342 F. Supp. 2d 1348, 1349 (J.P.M.L. 2004); *In re Advanced Inv. Mgmt*., 254 F. Supp. 2d 1377, 1379 (J.P.M.L. 2003). And while proceeding in separate actions would be burdensome to both Plaintiffs and Defendants, both parties would suffer no prejudice as the result of transfer and consolidation. All of the Actions are in the early stages, and discovery has not commenced in any of them. *See id*. A coordinated discovery schedule would therefore benefit all parties. *See In re Advanced Inv. Mgmt.*, 254 F. Supp. 2d at 1379.

3. Transfer and Consolidation Would Minimize the Risk of Inconsistent Pretrial Decisions, Including Inconsistent Class Certification Decisions

As the Panel has recognized, "[c]entralization will enable the transferee judge to make consistent rulings on such discovery disputes from a global vantage point" and will otherwise prevent inconsistent pretrial rulings on common factual issues. *See In re Yamaha*, 597 F. Supp. 2d 1377, 1378 (J.P.M.L. 2009); see also *In re Dow Chem*., 650 F. Supp. 187, 188 (J.P.M.L. 1986). There can be no legitimate dispute that having at least four Actions alleging the same misconduct and causes of actions against the same Defendants pending before at least four different federal

judges materially increases the likelihood of inconsistent pretrial decisions, including as to preemption and class certification, and judgments. *See In re AZEK Bldg. Prods*., 999 F. Supp. 2d 1366, 1368 (J.P.M.L. 2014); *In re Natrol*, 26 F. Supp. 3d at 1393. *See also*, *e.g.*, *In re H&R Block*, 435 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1349 (J.P.M.L. 2006) ("The three actions contain competing class allegations and involve facts of sufficient intricacy that could spawn challenging procedural questions and pose the risk of inconsistent and/or conflicting judgments."). Indeed, the Panel has long recognized that preventing inconsistent class decisions "presents one of the strongest reasons for" transfer and consolidation:

> [T]here are at least three other actions with class action claims which are in potential conflict with the claims asserted by these plaintiffs. Such a potential for conflicting or overlapping class actions presents one of the strongest reasons for transferring such related actions to a single district for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings which will include an early resolution of such potential conflicts.

In re Plumbing Fixtures, 308 F. Supp. at 243-44; see also *In re Sugar Industry,* 395 F. Supp. 1271, 1273 (J.P.M.L. 1975) ("We have consistently held that transfer of actions under Section 1407 is appropriate, if not necessary, where the possibility of inconsistent class determination exists."). Given that there are currently four proposed class actions with overlapping proposed classes pending before four different judges, the risk of inconsistent class decisions is particularly sharp in this instance. *See id*.

B. Plaintiff B.Z. Proposes Transfer to the Northern District of Illinois

Once the Panel determines that centralization is appropriate, it then "looks for an available and convenient transfer forum." Manual for Complex Litig. § 22.33, at 367 (4th Ed. 2011). The Panel balances a number of factors in determining the transferee forum, including: the experience, skill, and caseloads of the available judges; the number of cases pending in the jurisdiction; the convenience of the parties; the location of the witnesses and evidence; whether the district is in an

accessible metropolitan location; and the minimization of cost and inconvenience to the parties. *See In re Jamster Marketing Litigation*, 427 F. Supp. 2d 1366, 1368 (J.P.M.L. 2006); *In re Preferential Drug Products Pricing Antitrust Litigation*, 429 F. Supp. 1027, 1029 (J.P.M.L. 1977).

At present, *B.Z.* is assigned to Judge Durkin in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. *S.K.*, the first-filed of the Actions, is currently pending in the Northern District of California and is assigned to Judge Chhabria, with plaintiffs from California, Virginia, and Nevada. *Id*. *M.M.* is filed in the District of Nevada for a Nevada plaintiff, and *Rukeyser* is filed in the Southern District of Florida for a Florida plaintiff. *Id*. The six Plaintiffs are spread across multiple jurisdictions spanning the nation (California, Florida, Illinois, Nevada, and Virginia).

Smoore is China-based. The Distributor Defendants have their principal places of business in different states: Jupiter is an Arizona limited liability company with its principal place of business located in Phoenix, Arizona; 3Win is a Nevada corporation with its principal place of business located in Tempe, Arizona; CB Solutions is a Washington limited liability company with its principal place of business located in Everett, Washington; and Greenlane is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business located in Boca Raton, Florida. Substantial events giving rise to the Actions occurred in Illinois where the Products were sold.

With this broad dispersion of Plaintiffs and Defendants, The Northern District of Illinois in Chicago is the only one of the jurisdictions that provides a central location with a courthouse near two major airports (O'Hare International Airport and Chicago Midway International Airport) providing for ease of travel from each other location for the litigants, witnesses, and counsel. *See*, *e.g.*, *In re Wireless Telephone Fed. Cost Recovery Fees Litig.*, 293 F. Supp. 2d 1378, 1380 (J.P.M.L. 2003).

Plaintiff B.Z. thus respectfully proposes the Actions be transferred to Judge Durkin who is presiding over *B.Z.*. Judge Durkin is an experienced judge with substantial class action experience. Moreover, the Northern District of Illinois appears to have somewhat more capacity than the Northern District of California as reflected by the number of transferee judges currently overseeing MDLs (in addition to their regular caseload) as compared across those two districts.[3] The Panel has transferred and consolidated numerous cases before the Northern District of Illinois when an action was already pending there. *E.g.*, *In re: AIG Workers Comp. Ins. Policyholder Litig.,* 11 F. Supp. 3d 1349, 1350 (J.P.M.L. 2014) ("The Northern District of Illinois is a centrally located and convenient forum."); *In re Ocean Fed. Bank FSB Mortg. Servicing Litig.,* 314 F. Supp. 2d 1376, 1379 (J.P.M.L. 2004) (ordering transfer because of the District's "geographically central[]" location and because actions already were pending in the Northern District of Illinois).

The JPML has vast discretion and does not have to consolidate the pending Actions to the forum of the first-filed case, *S.K.*, in the Northern District of California. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a). As discussed above, the Panel is tasked with looking "for an available and convenient transfer forum." Manual for Complex Litig. § 22.33, at 367 (4th Ed. 2011). Indeed, the consolidation in the Northern District Court of Illinois would "promote the just and efficient conduct of such actions." 28 U.S.C. § 1407. The Northern District of Illinois serves as the most accessible jurisdiction and Judge Durkin is experienced, able, and prepared to handle, organize, and schedule the pretrial proceedings in the pending Actions.

[3] Indeed, as of the Panel's July 1, 2025 report, the Northern District of Illinois is currently overseeing 12 MDLs, one of which is before Judge Durkin, compared to 18 MDLs in the Northern District of California, two of which are before Judge Chhabria. *See* MDL Statistics Report, U.S.J.P.M.L., available at https://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/sites/jpml/files/Pending_MDL_Dockets_By_District-July-1-2025_0.pdf.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, Plaintiff B.Z. respectfully requests that the Panel issue an order transferring the actions listed on the Schedule of Actions to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois for consolidated pretrial proceedings.

Dated: July 29, 2025.

Respectfully submitted,

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